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We examine the effect of the interaction between resource rents and democracy on corruption 
for a panel of 29 Sub-Saharan countries during the period from 1985 to 2007. We find that 
higher resource rents lead to more corruption and that the effect is significantly stronger in 
less democratic countries. Surprisingly, we also find that higher resource rents lead to fewer 
internal conflicts and that less democratic countries face not a higher but a lower likelihood of 
conflicts following an increase in resource rents. We argue that these findings can be 
explained by the ability of the political elites in less democratic countries to more effectively 
quell the masses through redistribution of rents to the public. We support our argument by 
documenting that higher resource rents lead to more (less) government spending in less 
(more) democratic countries. Our findings suggest that the mechanisms through which 
resource rents affect corruption cannot be separated from political systems. 
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1. Introduction 
For many developing countries and most importantly for Sub-Saharan African countries, resource 
rents constitute a significant source of income. According to the World Bank (2010), resource rents 
represented on average 11 percent of Gross National Income (GNI) in 2006. For countries such as 
the Republic of Congo and Equatorial Guinea, resource rents represented approximately 80 percent 
of GNI that year. Given the economic significance of resource rents and the key role governments 
play in administering those rents, the consequences of higher resources rents on the level of 
corruption is an issue of key importance for both academics and policy makers who have an interest 
in the governance of Sub-Saharan African countries.
1  
In this paper, we analyze specifically whether the impact of oil rents on corruption is independent of 
political systems. World Bank President Zoellick, for example, argues that “our (The World 
Bank’s) message to our clients, whatever their political system, is that you cannot have successful 
development without good governance”.
2 While this quote celebrates the importance of good 
governance including the fight against corruption to achieve development, it also begs the question 
as to whether and how political systems affect good governance and corruption in particular. Sub-
Saharan countries provide an interesting laboratory for the study of such interaction. While those 
countries are relatively homogenous because of their shared history and geography, they also differ 
importantly in terms of the quality of their political institutions according to Marshall and Jaggers 
(2009). The mechanisms through which resource rents affect corruption in Sub-Saharan are thus 
likely to differ depending on their political systems. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine with rigorous panel data techniques the consequences of the 
interaction between resource rents and political systems on corruption. Our study differs from most 
existing studies that have primarily focused on exploring the relationship between resource rents 
                                                 
1 Governments are often involved in the natural resource sector either through taxation, the sale of licenses to foreign 
companies, or more directly through government-owned companies. 
2 April 6, 2011 at Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, D.C.,  
  see http://go.worldbank.org/ZLVSCW1IX0 
 3 
and corruption without taking into account the importance of the interaction between the former and 
political systems. Most recently, Arezki and Bruckner (2011) examine the effects of oil rents on 
corruption for a panel of 30 oil-exporting countries during the period 1992–2005. They find that an 
increase in oil rents significantly  increases  corruption.  Interestingly,  they  also  document  a 
significant effect of oil rents on corruption in countries with a high share of state participation in oil 
production while no such link exists in countries where state participation in oil production is low. 
Beyond the participation of the state in the resource sector, there are many channels through which 
political systems may mediate the relationship between resource rents and corruption. The most 
straightforward channel is the presence of checks and balances in democracies that are likely to help 
prevent the squandering of public funds in general and of resource rents in particular given the often 
ill-defined property rights associated with the latter. Because democracies function by consensus 
and given the presence of constraints on the power of the executive branch, democracies may be 
less prone to so-called pork-barrel spending which is often a way to disguise the misappropriation 
of public funds. In this paper, we provide evidence that redistribution through government spending 
following a resource bonanza depends on the political system and thus can help us understand the 
channels through which resource rents affect corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Our main finding is that higher resource rents are conducive to more corruption and that the effect 
is significantly stronger in less democratic countries. Surprisingly, we also find that higher resource 
rents lead to fewer internal conflicts and that less democratic countries face not a higher but a lower 
likelihood of conflicts following an increase in resource rents. We argue that these findings can be 
explained by the ability of the political elites in less democratic countries to more effectively quell 
the masses through redistribution to the public. We support our argument by documenting that 
higher resource rents lead to more (less) government spending in less (more) democratic countries. 
Our findings suggest that the mechanisms through which resource rents affect corruption cannot be 
separated from political systems. 4 
The political science literature has so far mainly focused the impact of resource rents on the political 
system. Indeed, Ross (1999b) reviews the political aspects of why resource rich countries tend to 
manage their economies poorly, arguing that state ownership of the resource industry leads 
politicians to abuse political power for private gain. More specifically, Karl (2004) argues that 
countries dependent on oil are often characterized by corruption and exceptionally poor governance, 
a culture of rent  seeking, and  high incidence of civil conflict and inter-state war. While Ross 
(1999a) shows that oil rents significantly undermine democracy, Haber and Menaldo (2009) find 
that oil does not significantly foster authoritarianism. This literature has, however, overlooked the 
potential for an interaction between resource rents and political institutions in determining the level 
of corruption. We contribute to this literature by providing evidence that political systems play a 
role in shaping the way in which resource rents affect corruption.
3 
A related literature also looks at the effects of resource rents on state stability. Several scholars have 
offered different theories of the impact of natural resource wealth on civil conflict: mineral wealth 
could foster conflicts by funding rebel groups (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004); weakening state 
institutions (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Snyder and Bhavnani, 2005); making the state a more 
attractive target for rebels (Fearon and Laitin, 2003); facilitating trade shocks (Humphreys, 2005); 
making separatism financially attractive in resource rich regions (Le Billon, 2005; Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004); or through other processes (Ross, 2006; Humphreys, 2005). We also contribute to 
this literature by providing evidence that the competition for the resource itself is mediated by the 
level of democracy. In other words, we present  evidence  for Sub-Saharan Africa that more 
democratic countries suffer not less but more from accrued competition for resources and thus face 
more internal tensions than less democratic countries.  
   
                                                 
3   Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2009) provide a rare attempt to investigate the impact on the interaction between 
resource rents and democracy on corruption. They find empirical evidence for the prediction of their game-
theoretical model that resource rents lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the democratic institutions is 
relatively poor, but not otherwise.  5 
Finally, studying the impact of resource rents on corruption is also relevant to understanding the 
economic performance of resource rich countries. Indeed, our paper is related to the literature on the 
impact of natural resources on economic growth, also known as the resource curse (see Frankel, 
2011, for a survey). Moreover, our paper is related to the literature on corruption and growth 
performance. Among others, Mauro (1995) attempts using cross-sectional regressions to isolate the 
exogenous effect of corruption on economic growth and investment  using measures of  ethnic 
fractionalization as instruments. He finds that corruption has a statistically significant negative 
impact on both growth and investment.  
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the resource rents 
and data on political institutions; Section 3 explains our estimation strategy; Section 4 discusses the 
main empirical results; and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data  
Resource Rents. The resource rents data are taken from World Bank (2011). Natural resources give 
rise to rents because they are not produced; in contrast, for produced goods and services competitive 
forces will expand supply until economic profits are driven to zero. An economic rent represents an 
excess return to a given factor of production. For each type of resource and each country, unit 
resource rents are thereby derived by taking the difference between world prices (to reflect the 
social opportunity cost of resource extraction) and the average unit extraction or harvest costs 
(including a “normal” return on capital).
 4 Unit rents are then multiplied by the physical quantity 
extracted or harvested to arrive at total rent (see Hamilton and Ruta, 2008 for more details on 
resource rents computation).  
 
 
                                                 
4 The energy resources include oil, natural gas and coal, while metals and minerals include bauxite, copper, gold, iron 
ore, lead, nickel, phosphate, silver, tin, and zinc.  6 
Table 1. Description of Variables 
Variable  Description  Source 
Resource Rents  Resource rent flows as % of GDP. This aggregate covers coal, oil, gas, 
minerals and forests. 
World Bank (2010) 
Corruption  The corruption score captures the likelihood that government officials 
will demand special payments and the extent to which illegal payments 
are expected throughout government tiers. The score ranges from 1 to 
6, with higher values indicating less corruption. 
Political Risk Services, 
(2009) 
Internal Conflicts  This is an assessment of political violence in the country and its actual 
or potential impact on governance. The highest rating is given to those 
countries where there is no armed or civil opposition to the 
government and the government does not indulge in arbitrary violence, 
direct or indirect, against its own people. The lowest rating is given to 
a country embroiled in an ongoing civil war. The risk rating assigned 
is the sum of three subcomponents, each with a maximum score of 
four points and a minimum score of 0 points. A score of 4 points 
suggests Very Low Risk and a score of 0 points to Very High Risk.  
 
Political Risk Services, 
(2009) 
Polity2  The Polity2 score  is based on the constraints placed on the chief 
executive, the competitiveness of political participation, and the 
openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment. The original 
score ranges from -10 to +10, with higher values indicating stronger 
democratic institutions. 
Polity IV database 




The ethnic fractionalization index measures the probability that two 
randomly selected individuals in a country will not belong to the same 
ethnic group. The index ranges between 0 and 1 and is strictly 
increasing in the number of groups. 
Alesina et al. (2003) 
Government 
Spending 
Logarithmic change in government expenditures per capita in 
thousands 2005 PPP USD.  
 
Heston, A., R. Summers 
and B. Aten (2009) 
 
Democracy. Democracy is measured by the revised combined Polity score (Polity2) of the Polity 
IV database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009). The Polity2 score ranges from -10 to +10, with higher 
values indicating more democratic institutions. To examine also specifically the political 
competition and executive constraints channel, we use the polity sub-scores on constraints on the 
chief executive and political competition. According to the Polity IV project, constraints on the 
executive mirror the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief 
executives and span the range from 1 to 7, with greater values indicating tighter constraints. 
Political competition measures the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership 7 
can be pursued in the political arena. This indicator ranges from 1 to 10, with greater values 
denoting more competition. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Tables 1 and 2 describe all other variables used in our empirical analysis as well as some summary 
statistics. Appendix table 1 provides a list of countries included in our empirical analysis. 
 
3. Estimation Strategy 
We now explain our estimation strategy that allows us to estimate the effect of resource rents on 
changes in corruption (and other outcome variables of interest). Specifically, we estimate the 
model: 
ΔCorruptionit = µi+αCorruptionit-1 + γt +βResource Rentsit + λInteraction it + uit 
where µi are country fixed effects that capture unobservable time-invariant country characteristics, 
and γt are year fixed effects that capture shocks common to all countries. The parameter estimate β 
Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max Observations
ΔCorruption -0.01 0.10 -0.92 0.69 662
ΔInternal Conflicts 0.01 0.17 -0.92 0.92 662
ΔGovernment expenditure 0.01 0.18 -2.14 1.72 1719
Resource Rents 0.98 1.86 -4.61 5.37 5289
Polity2 Score 2.08 0.45 0.69 3.08 1596
Executive Constraints Score 1.02 0.46 0.00 1.95 1596
Political Competition Score 1.18 0.50 0.00 2.27 1596
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.63 0.24 0.00 0.93 1710
Note: All variables are taken in log. Polity2 score has been rescaled adding 12 to the original score.8 
reflects, therefore, the (short-run) marginal effect of resource rents on changes in corruption.
5 The 
parameter estimate λ captures the marginal effect of the interaction between resource rents and 
country-specific Polity2 score made time invariant by taking the average over the sample period. 
We also controlled for  lagged corruption (Lagged Corruptionit-1), which captures convergence 
effects in the level of corruption as corruption scores are bounded. We present estimates using least 
squares estimation but also system-GMM estimation (Blundell and Bond, 1998) to deal  with 
possible biases arising from dynamic panel data estimates in the presence of fixed effects. The error 
term uit is clustered at the country level and may hence be arbitrarily serially correlated within 
countries. 
   
4. Main Results  
Resource Rents and Corruption.  Table 3 summarizes our estimation results for the link between 
within-country variation in resource rents and within-country variation in corruption. Column (1) 
shows the least squares estimates where control variables are country fixed effects as well as year 
fixed effects (both jointly significant at the 1% level). Using the column (1) estimate, the impact 
of a shock to corruption at time t would take about 3.9 years to dissipate by one-half.
6 The obtained 
point estimate on our resource rents measure is -0.03, which is, however, not statistically significant 
at conventional levels. Because a higher corruption score taken from Political Risk Services (2009) 
indicates less corruption, the point estimate in column (1) implies that a one standard deviation 
increase in the resource rents increases corruption by about 0.6 standard deviations.
7  
In column (2) we show that this adverse link between oil rents and corruption remains statistically 
insignificant when omitting to control for time effects. However, column (3) which is our preferred 
                                                 
5 Long-run coefficient could be retrieved by dividing the short-run coefficient by -1/α. 
6 The half-life is computed as log(0.5)/log(α+1) where α is the coefficient estimate on the lagged level dependent 
variable. 
7 The result is obtained by first multiplying the coefficient associated with the individual effect of resource rents that is 
1.86 by the standard deviation of the latter that is 0.03 and then by dividing the product by the standard deviation of 
corruption that is 0.1.  9 
regression result documents that the estimates of the individual effect of resource rents on 
corruption while remaining quantitatively similar to the previous estimates becomes significant at 
the 10 percent level when using the system-GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Indeed, 
system-GMM estimators should be preferred over least squares estimators which yield estimates of 
dynamic panel data models that are biased in the presence of country fixed effects.
8 
Table 3. Resource Rents, Democracy and Corruption 
 
 
Table 3 (columns (1) to (3)) also documents the estimates of an interaction between resource rents 
and country specific Polity2 scores to explore potential cross-country heterogeneity in the impact of 
resource rents on corruption. The interaction term involving the multiple of the resource rents and 
the democracy variable is added in the spirit of Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) and Collier and 
Hoeffler (2009). The interaction is positive indicating that stronger political institutions would lead 
to less corruption following a resource boom. Using results from column (1) the overall effects of 
resource rents would be computed as dCorr/dRent = -0.030 + 0.017*Pol2.  We find that these 
                                                 
8   A further advantage of the system-GMM estimation is that the use of past first differences as instruments for the 
levels of the right-hand-side variables reduces concerns that estimates involving our control variables (resource rents 
and interactive effects) are biased due to their endogenous response to changes in corruption. First-order and 
second-order serial correlation tests and the Hansen test on over-identifying moment conditions indicate that the 
estimated model is correctly specified. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM
Lagged Corruption -0.164*** -0.136*** -0.066 -0.165*** -0.122*** -0.163*** -0.127***
[0.030] [0.034] [0.045] [0.030] [0.037] [0.030] [0.038]
Resource Rents -0.030 -0.037 -0.029* -0.021* -0.018* -0.011 -0.026**
[0.022] [0.029] [0.016] [0.011] [0.011] [0.013] [0.011]
Interaction with Polity2 0.017** 0.021** 0.016**
[0.008] [0.010] [0.007]
Interaction with Executive Constraints 0.029*** 0.020**
[0.010] [0.009]
Interaction with Political Competition 0.016** 0.025***
[0.007] [0.009]
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.131 0.069 0.134 0.131
Observations 602 602 599 602 599 602 599
Countries 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
Corruption
Note: The dependent variable is Δcorruption. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, 
 ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.10 
interaction terms are quantitatively large and statistically significant. So much so that the overall 
effect of resource rents on corruption is negative for the country with the lowest Polity2 score on 
average  over the sample period,  namely,  Senegal,  while  the interaction becomes  positive for 
Mauritius, the country with the highest Polity2 score.  In turn, columns (4) and (5) use a measure of 
executive constraints while columns (6) to (7) use a measure of political competition instead of the 
Polity2 score to test whether our main results are robust to the use of specific component of quality 
of political institutions. We find that the estimates of the interaction between resource rents and 
both  measures of executive constraints and political competition are positive and statistically 
significant at least at the 5 percent level. Those results suggest that stronger political institutions 
through limiting executive power and enhancing political competition do attenuate the negative 
effect of resource rents on corruption.  This result suggests that weaker political institutions 
exacerbate the impact of higher resource rents on corruption. Democracy may indeed effectively 
restrain rent seekers, thus making resource rents less prone to corruption in democracies in the face 
of accrued resource revenues. These findings suggest that resource rich economies need particularly 
strong checks and balances to contain the potential damage from rent seeking in the face of resource 
booms. This result follows from the earlier one and suggests that the checks and balances that 
Collier and Hoeffler (2008) call for are not yet in place in many countries. From this point of view, 
our empirical findings on the interaction between natural resource dependence and democracy 
accord also with those of Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) who report that good institutions 
deflate the damaging effects of resource dependence on growth.  
Oil Rents and Internal Conflicts.  In order to foster our understanding of the effect of the 
interaction between resource rents and political institutions on corruption, it is useful to investigate 
whether resource rents have an impact on internal stability depending on political systems. We 
explore this question in Table 4 by examining how resource rents and their interaction with the 
Polity2 score affect the likelihood of internal conflict.  To capture internal conflicts we use an 11 
assessment of political violence from Political Risk Services (2009), a higher score indicating less 
internal political violence. In column (1) we estimate the individual effect of resource rents on 
internal conflicts and find that resource rents decrease in a statistically significant manner the 
assessment of internal conflicts. In columns (2) to (4) we also include an interaction term between 
resource rents and the Polity2 score. As can be seen from columns (2) and (3), the estimates of the 
interaction are statistically significant and quantitatively large. So much so that for a country with 
the same level of democracy as in Mauritius, an increase by one standard deviation in resource rents 
barely improves the assessment of internal stability (0.1 standard deviation). However, for a country 
with a lower level of democracy comparable to the one in Senegal, an increase by one standard 
deviation in resource rents leads to an almost 1.2 standard deviation increase in the assessment of 
internal stability. We do find, however, that neither the estimate of the individual effect of resource 
rents nor the estimate of interaction between resource rents and the Polity2 score are significant 
when using GMM estimator.  
Table 4. Resource Rents, Democracy and Internal Conflicts 
 
 
Oil Rents and Government Expenditure. What explains the moderating role of  political 
institutions in the relationship between resource rents and internal conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa? 
There could clearly be a number of possible reasons but a useful way in answering this question is 
to focus on aspects of the distribution of resource rents between the political elite and the masses. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS GMM
Lagged Internal Conflicts -0.360*** -0.367*** -0.288*** -0.146*
[0.036] [0.039] [0.034] [0.078]
Resource Rents 0.045*** 0.144*** 0.167*** 0.008
[0.013] [0.049] [0.047] [0.019]
Interaction with Polity2 -0.045** -0.053** -0.003
[0.022] [0.020] [0.012]
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.301 0.303 0.177
Observations 623 602 602 599
Countries 29 28 28 28
Note: The dependent variable is Δinternal conflict. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, 
 ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
Internal Conflict12 
Extending transfers to the population may be an effective way to quell the masses following a 
resource boom. It may,  however,  prove  harder for democracies to effectively quell the masses 
through redistribution to the public. This can be the case because of the scrutiny of government 
actions resulting from the existence of constraints on the executive power and checks and balances. 
Those constraints and checks are likely to hamper accrued redistribution disguised as additional 
government spending. In contrast, in less democratic countries  where  no  such constraints and 
checks and balance exist, the  content and the volume of government spending  may increase 
drastically following a resource bonanza so as to quell the masses. By doing so, the political elite in 
less democratic countries may significantly reduce the risk of conflict and thus preserve its rent 
income from resource revenues.  
Table 5. Resource Rents, Democracy and Government Spending  
 
 
In Table 5 we provide evidence supporting our argument by documenting that higher resource rents 
lead to more (less) government spending in less (more) democratic countries. In columns (1) we 
estimate the individual effect of resource rents on government spending and find that resource rents 
increase in a statistically and economically significant  manner  government spending. A one 
standard deviation increase in resource rents leads to an increase by 0.16 standard deviation in 
government spending. In columns (2) to (4) we also include an interaction term between resource 
rents and the  Polity2 score. As can be seen from columns (2) and (5), the estimates of the 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS GMM
Lagged Expenditure -0.196** -0.130* -0.120* -0.105
[0.078] [0.066] [0.066] [0.073]
Resource Rents 0.016*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.017*
[0.006] [0.017] [0.015] [0.009]
Interaction with Polity2 -0.016** -0.016** -0.008**
[0.006] [0.006] [0.003]
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Effects Yes Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.065 0.051 0.017
Observations 1438 1312 1312 1265
Countries 43 39 39 39
Note: The dependent variable is Δgovernment spending. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, 
 ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
Government Spending13 
interaction are statistically significant and quantitatively large.
9 So much so that for a country with 
the same level of democracy as in Mauritius, an increase by one standard deviation in resource rents 
decreases government spending by 0.08 standard deviations whereas for a country with a level of 
democracy as in Senegal government spending would increase  by 0.1 standard deviation.  We 
attribute this dichotomous effect to the ability of political elites  in  autocracies  to  effectively 
redistribute to the public in periods of resource bonanza rendered possible by the lack of scrutiny 
they face. Our findings suggest that the mechanisms through which resource rents affect corruption 
cannot be separated from political systems. 
Table 6. Robustness Checks 
 
 
Robustness Checks. To ascertain that our main results are not driven by other factors than political 
systems we further control for the level of ethnic fractionalization. Indeed, Sub-Saharan Africa is 
the most ethnically fractionalized continent (see Alesina et al., 2003). Furthermore, ethnic 
fractionalization has been used either as an instrument for corruption (see Mauro, 1995) or as a key 
determinant of the likelihood of conflicts (see Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Table 6 documents the 
results of our previous regressions adding to the specification an interaction between resource rents 
and the country specific level of ethnic fractionalization. Albeit some estimates have become less 
                                                 
9 These results are robust to using GMM estimators and to the use of time effects as shown in column (5) which is our 
preferred estimate. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM
Lagged Corruption -0.164*** -0.067
[0.030] [0.046]
Lagged Internal Conflicts -0.369*** -0.151**
[0.038] [0.076]
Lagged Government Expenditure -0.131* -0.099
[0.066] [0.074]
Resource Rents -0.007 -0.032** 0.155* 0.015 0.046** 0.018*
[0.033] [0.017] [0.056] [0.021] [0.017] [0.011]
Interaction with Polity2 -0.002 0.017** -0.053* -0.012 -0.017** -0.009*
[0.019] [0.007] [0.031] [0.012] [0.007] [0.006]
Interaction with Ethnic Fractionalization -0.048 -0.003 -0.021 -0.049** -0.006 -0.006
[0.033] [0.014] [0.061] [0.022] [0.018] [0.010]
R-squared 0.133 0.304 0.054
Observations 602 599 602 599 1284 1276
Countries 28 28 28 28 38 38
Corruption Internal Conflicts Government Expenditure
Note: The dependent variables are respectively Δcorruption, Δinternal conflicts and Δgovernment expenditure. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  
*Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. All regressions included fixed and time effects but estimates are not shown.14 
statistically significant, the signs and magnitudes appear virtually unchanged. This suggests that our 
main result that political institutions moderate the relationship between resource rents and 
corruption/internal stability is not driven by omitted variables such ethnic fractionalization. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Understanding the interplay between political systems and resource rents is a matter of key 
importance for the design of risk management strategies to tackle corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa 
as well as in other regions. We have here attempted to show that, indeed, it is not advisable to 
separate the issue of resource rents from political systems when studying the evolution of 
corruption following a resource bonanza. We found that, paradoxically, while corruption resulting 
from an increase in resource rents decreases  in more democratic countries, the likelihood of 
conflicts increases in the latter countries. This is because more democratic countries are less able to 
redistribute to the public because of the level of scrutiny they face. In contrast, less democratic 
countries are able to dispense pork-barrel spending to disguise redistribution and quell the masses.  
To best manage the opportunities created by natural resources for development, a new initiative 
called the Natural Resource Charter has promulgated a set of economic principles for governments 
and societies to guide their choices and suggest strategies that governments might pursue. Our study 
could help shed light on the necessity to implement policies tailored to political systems. One could 
also more preventively think about designing early warning systems which would, for instance, 
alert civil society that autocracies may be more prone to increased spending during a resource 
bonanza. It is, however, clear that exposing such behavior can only be successful if the population, 
whom the political elites are trying so hard to quell, can be informed and educated around those 
issues of misappropriation. Thus it is important to recognize the importance of civil society to 
enforce more transparency in budget activity and that judicial systems are also truly independent to 
mitigate the consequences of weak political institutions.  15 
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Appendix Table 1. List of Countries 
 
1 Angola 15 Mali
2 Burkina Faso 16 Mozambique
3 Botswana 17 Malawi
4 Cameroon 18 Namibia
5 Congo, Republic of 19 Niger
6 Ethiopia 20 Nigeria
7 Gabon 21 Senegal
8 Ghana 22 Togo
9 Guinea 23 Tanzania
10 Gambia, The 24 Uganda
11 Guinea-Bissau 25 South Africa
12 Kenya 26 Congo, Dem. Rep.
13 Liberia 27 Zambia
14 Madagascar 28 Zimbabwe